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SO MUCH FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE EVER-
CHANGING STANDARDS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
UNDER TITLE VII 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider a woman working as a corporate attorney in a prestigious law 
firm.  Several of her colleagues refer to her as “stupid,” comment on her body 
and tell her about the things they would like to do with her alone.  There is 
probably little argument that this is considered sexual harassment.  Now 
consider a woman who is employed as a seasonal truck driver for a 
construction company.  Her supervisor calls her, among other things, “dumb.”1  
The supervisor also states over the CB radio to another employee that he 
sometimes wants “to smash a woman in the face.”2  Consider a woman who 
works as a secretary in a refinery.  Her co-workers display posters of nude and 
partially clad women in their offices and in other work areas.3  Additionally 
her co-workers use obscene language and call her a “fat ass.”4  Or, consider a 
woman working in a factory.  A co-worker calls her a slut.5  Her supervisor 
looks at her breasts and remarks, “You can rub up against me anytime,” and 
also tells the woman, “You would kill me . . . .  I don’t know if I can handle it, 
but I’d die with a smile on my face.”6  The same supervisor also says, while 
the woman is bending over, “Back up. . . . You can back right up to me.”7  
Most people would believe these to be clear cases of sexual harassment under 
Title VII.8  But are they? 
Women who work in fields that are traditionally male-dominated earn 
smaller salaries than their male counterparts, are less likely to be promoted, 
believed or respected, and, consequently, are more likely to be subject to 
 
 1. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995).  That same 
supervisor was also accused of calling the woman a “cunt.”  Id. 
 2. Id. at 1536. 
 3. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
 4. See id.  Rabidue’s co-worker habitually used vulgar words such as “cunt,” “tits” and 
“pussy.”  Id. 
 5. See Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994). 
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harassment.9  In a study by the U.S. Department of Labor after the enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, figures indicated that there was still significant 
disparate treatment of women in the work force.10  In 1958, women earned 
60.8% of the average salaries made by men, and ten years later, women still 
only earned 58.2% of the salaries that their male counterparts were making.11  
That same study indicated that in 1968, 60% of women but only 20% of men 
earned less than $5,000 per year, and that 28% of men and 3% of women in the 
workforce earned more than $10,000 per year.12  Even though these numbers 
were gathered thirty years ago, these types of figures are indicative of the 
disparate treatment still prevalent in society, especially in circumstances where 
women choose to work in traditionally male-dominated fields. 
Does it matter that a woman chooses to work in a factory or in the 
construction industry?  What if she works in a school?  Or a law firm?  Should 
the environment where an individual works matter when evaluating a sexual 
harassment claim?  If a court understands Title VII13 to mean that a woman’s 
sexual harassment claim depends on the nature of her work environment, 
essentially it is judicially sanctioning that a woman will assume the risk of 
sexual harassment by entering into certain areas of traditionally male-
dominated roles.14  In a complex way, most work environments are 
traditionally male-dominated in the sense that women have systemically been 
denied the opportunity to work outside of the home.15  Accordingly, men have 
 
 9. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972), reprinted 
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137 [hereinafter Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972].  See also, 
Virginia Valian, Roundtable: The Cognitive Bases of Gender Bias, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 
1038-40 (1999).  Professor Valian noted that women’s achievements in the workplace are 
generally worth less than men’s.  For example, a Bachelor of Arts will increase a man’s salary by 
$28,000, but the same degree will only increase a woman’s salary by $9,000.  Additionally, 
studies indicate that women are generally required to meet a higher criterion for promotion than 
men.  As Professor Valian noted, “[t]he small but systematic undervaluation of women 
culminates in women’s smaller salaries compared to men, slower rates of promotion, and lesser 
access to resources necessary to excel at their jobs.”  Id. at 1050. 
 10. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. 
 14. See generally Gross, 53 F.3d 1531. 
 15. For an example of a woman being denied the opportunity to work in a male-dominated 
field, see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (J. Bradley concurring).  In Bradwell, the 
plaintiff, a woman named Myra Bradwell, was suing to be admitted into the Illinois State Bar.  
The majority of the Court held that her right to practice law was not a privilege and immunity 
guaranteed to the plaintiff under the 14th Amendment.  However, Justice Bradley, in his 
concurring opinion, also believed that the plaintiff should not be admitted into the bar, but for 
differing reasons: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the 
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.  Man is, or should be, woman’s 
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always worked outside of the home, including fields that are now considered 
female-dominated, such as teaching.  Obviously, there are some careers today 
that are still male-dominated.16  But should judicially sanctioned exceptions be 
made for these work environments by stating our belief that it is excusable or 
justifiable in these particular fields to permit a hostile work environment?  
There is conflicting evidence which indicates that perhaps not everyone is 
willing to embrace a uniform standard in evaluating sexual harassment 
claims.17 
The unwillingness to create a uniform standard for evaluating sexual 
harassment claims perhaps is not the largest obstacle for those who have been 
sexually harassed to overcome.  It does create a significant problem, however, 
for those individuals who are harassed and feel that they have no recourse 
because they work in a traditionally blue collar or male-dominated 
environment.18  This also creates significant barriers to women in the 
workplace.  Because there is not a uniform standard for evaluating sexual 
harassment claims, women are faced with a difficult decision—sue their 
harasser and face the consequences, or put up with the harassment.  However, 
if the woman works in a blue collar environment, her decision becomes even 
more difficult.  Because it is not clear whether certain work environments will 
dictate a stricter sexual harassment standard, the woman must make an 
increasingly difficult choice—sue under Title VII, hoping that the court will 
not sanction “traditionally” crude behavior, or endure the hostile work 
environment. 
Courts are essentially justifying crude behavior in certain work 
environments, simply because these “[i]ndelicate forms of expression [in the 
work environment] are accepted or endured as normal human behavior.”19  
These courts are also implying that women who work in blue collar fields are 
accustomed to this behavior and thus are somehow better equipped to deal with 
 
protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.  The constitution of 
the family organization . . . indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs 
to the domain and functions of womanhood. 
Id. at 141. 
 16. Some fields are even protected to remain male-dominated if it is determined that sex is a 
“bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise. . . .”  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).  See also JUDITH 
BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 80 (2d ed. 1996). 
 17. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537. 
 18. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d, 
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the standard for sexual harassment claims is “different 
depending upon the work environment”). 
 19. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537 (10th Cir. 1995).  This is a classic example of judicially 
sanctioning a disparate standard for males in the workplace and accordingly permitting employers 
to manifest these differences in their working environments. 
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it.  Accordingly, it seems as though the courts are discouraging these women 
from filing otherwise valid sexual harassment claims. 
This Comment analyzes whether certain work environments should dictate 
a stricter standard for sexual harassment claims, and more specifically, whether 
a woman working in a blue collar or traditionally male-dominated industry 
should have to meet a higher threshold of abuse for her sexual harassment 
claim or not.  Part II of this Comment outlines the relevant case history as well 
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and how it relates to sexual harassment claims.  Part 
III details the current status of the case law and the notable circuit split with 
regard to the context of the working environment.20  Part IV contains the 
author’s analysis of the circuit split.  This Comment concludes by offering a 
solution to the differing viewpoints of the circuits to achieve a more uniform 
standard under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
II.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect individuals from 
hostile work environments and unlawful employment practices.21  The original 
purpose of Title VII was “to eliminate . . . discrimination in employment based 
on race, color, religion, or national origin.”22  While sex-based discrimination 
was not included in the original codification, it was added at the last minute on 
the floor of the House of Representatives.23 
 
 20. Compare Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538 (holding that the standard for evaluating sexual 
harassment claims depends upon the context of the work environment), with Williams v. Gen. 
Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (expressly rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that the 
standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims varies depending upon the work environment). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) reads as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. 
 22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391 [hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1964]. 
 23. See BAER, supra note 16, at 80.  The original Title VII did not address sex 
discrimination.  The amendment adding “sex” was proposed by a notorious opponent of civil 
rights who urged his colleagues “to protect our spinster friends in their ‘right’ to a husband and 
family.”  This last minute joke failed when a coalition of women legislators saved the 
amendment.  Id. 
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was established 
by authority of Title VII in 1964.24  However, the EEOC’s authority was 
limited in that it could not issue judicially enforceable orders.25  In 1972, 
Congress re-evaluated Title VII and determined that the employment needs of 
women and minorities were still not being met,26 and therefore Congress 
granted the EEOC more authority to issue cease and desist orders to employers 
who continued to ignore or circumvent Title VII mandates.27  The purpose 
behind the legislation was “to implement in a meaningful way the national 
policy of equal employment opportunity for employees without discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.”28 
In its efforts to reduce and eliminate sexual harassment issues, the EEOC 
codified several different guidelines.  However, these guidelines are somewhat 
vague and perhaps even contradictory in nature.  For example, the EEOC 
established guidelines for sexual harassment claims, including what constitutes 
sexual harassment, how to evaluate those claims and when an employer will be 
held liable for an employee’s conduct.29  In determining what will constitute a 
sexual harassment claim, the EEOC considered the following: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) 
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or 
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions 
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.30 
The EEOC did not mention anywhere in this codification differing standards of 
evaluating sexual harassment claims contingent upon the context of the work 
 
 24. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 
 25. Id.  Under the authority of Title VII, the EEOC was limited to essentially conciliatory 
functions.  Id. 
 26. Id.  According to the legislative history of 1972, 
[w]omen currently comprise approximately 38% of the total work force of the Nation.  
There are approximately 30 million employed women.  Recent statistics released from the 
U.S. Department of Labor indicate that there exists a profound economic discrimination 
against women workers . . . .  Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class.  
Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated because of their sex. 
Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998). 
 30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).  For purposes of this Comment, subsection (3) will 
constitute most of the analysis.  In determining whether the standard should be different for 
varying work environments, the primary concern is whether it is an “intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.”  Id. 
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environment, presumably indicating that the EEOC did not believe that the 
work environment should be a guiding factor in evaluating sexual harassment 
claims. 
However, the EEOC also sanctioned a totality of circumstances test31 that 
it believed would be key in evaluating claims of sexual harassment under Title 
VII: 
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the 
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the 
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in 
which the alleged incidents occurred.  The determination of the legality of a 
particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.32 
This codification implies that, in fact, there are varying standards for sexual 
harassment, depending upon the context of the work environment.33 
The EEOC also emphasized the importance of preventing and eliminating 
sexual harassment in the work place by taking affirmative action, disapproving 
of poor work behavior and sensitizing employees to the repercussions of sexual 
harassment.34  Most notably, the EEOC determined it was crucial that “an 
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from 
occurring . . . .”35  It was deemed important that the employer take affirmative 
steps to prevent the harassment before it began and to overcome that 
harassment before it spun out of control.36 
While it appears that the EEOC’s codifications have set forth its opinions 
on whether the context of the work environment dictates a higher standard in 
evaluating sexual harassment claims, these somewhat contradictory guidelines, 
as well as later case law, indicate that it is not altogether clear whether the 
 
 31. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).  This “totality of 
circumstances test” was set forth by the Supreme Court in Harris in 1993 and was also codified 
by the EEOC in the same year.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b). 
 32. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. (noting that the EEOC will look at “the context in which the alleged incidents 
occurred.”  While this appears to set forth the EEOC’s opinion on the matter, later case law will 
show that it is not altogether clear whether certain work environments should dictate higher 
standards.). 
 34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f). 
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should 
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as 
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate 
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of 
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned. 
Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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work environment should dictate stricter standards.37 This confusion has left 
some serious interpretive issues up to the federal courts.  The most notable of 
these issues is the circuit split addressed in this Comment regarding the context 
of the work environment.38  While Title VII was inspired by lofty goals, it 
wasn’t necessarily embraced by employers.39  Congress enabled the EEOC to 
be more proactive in its fight against discrimination and harassment in the 
workplace.40  However, the EEOC codifications did not address all areas of 
sexual harassment concerns.  It is these omissions that are the concerns of 
federal courts. 
B. Title VII Interpretative Case Law 
The Supreme Court has decided many sexual harassment claims pursuant 
to Title VII.  Most certainly, the breadth and scope of sexual harassment has 
expanded over the years to adjust to changing perceptions in society.  One 
issue the Court has failed to address over time, however, is whether certain 
work environments, specifically blue collar or traditionally male-dominated 
fields, should be required to meet a higher threshold of sexual harassment than 
other fields.  What follows sets forth the early case law leading up to the circuit 
split regarding the work environment standard in sexual harassment cases 
brought pursuant to Title VII. 
i. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 
In an early case, a federal district court was faced with a claim of sexual 
harassment under Title VII where the plaintiff, Rabidue, worked as a secretary 
in a refining company.41  The court first addressed whether Title VII even 
spoke to sexual harassment claims.  The court found that sexual harassment “is 
within the clear letter—and probably the spirit—of Title VII,”42 and therefore 
 
 37. See Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
standard for sexual harassment should not vary depending upon the context of the work 
environment). 
 38. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims depends upon the context of the work 
environment), with Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (expressly rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that 
the standard for sexual harassment varies depending upon the work environment). 
 39. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.  Congress recognized that “[d]espite 
the commitment of Congress to the goal of equal employment opportunity for all our citizens, the 
machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not adequate.  Despite the progress which 
has been made . . . discrimination against minorities and women continues.”  Id. 
 40. Id.  (“It is essential that . . . effective enforcement procedures be provided the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission to strengthen its efforts to reduce discrimination in 
employment.”). 
 41. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 422 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
 42. Id. at 428.  The court noted that under the original Title VII, sexual harassment was not a 
large concern.  In fact, the court noted that the prohibition against sexual harassment in the work 
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sexual harassment claims were valid assertions under Title VII.  In that case, 
Rabidue worked with a man who used vulgar language and made obscene 
comments about women.43  Additionally, other male employees displayed 
when their offices and other prominent work areas pictures of nude or partially 
clad women.44  The district court held that courts are entitled to contemplate 
the employment environment in which the plaintiff suffered the harassment 
when evaluating the validity of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.45  
Accordingly, this gives courts authority to make considerations regarding the 
education of the plaintiff’s co-workers and supervisors, the physical design of 
the plaintiff’s work area and the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff 
regarding the kind of conduct he or she reasonably believes constitutes sexual 
harassment.46 
The court went on to hold that the standard for determining sexual 
harassment is different depending upon the work environment.47  Most 
troubling was the court’s determination that “it cannot seriously be disputed 
that in some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and 
vulgar.  Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound.  
Title VII was not meant to—or can—change this.”48  Accordingly, the district 
court found that Rabidue had not established a valid sexual harassment claim 
and therefore ruled against her.49 
 
place was added to Title VII as a last minute joke by a notorious opponent of civil rights.  
However, while sexual harassment was not originally a concern, it is one of the most cited Title 
VII issues today.  Id. at 427-29.  See also BAER, supra note 16, at 79-80. 
 43. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423 (noting that one co-worker of Rabidue used words like 
“cunt,” “pussy” and “tits” and that same co-worker called Rabidue a “fat ass”). 
 44. Id.  The court found that Rabidue was subjected to these pictures during her work day.  
Id. 
 45. Id. at 430. 
 46. Id.  The court was interpreting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1998), which defines sexual 
harassment as conduct which “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work 
environment.”  The court was analyzing the use of the word “unreasonably.”  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430.  The court went on to say: 
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for 
equal employment opportunity for the female workers of America.  But it is quite 
different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in 
the social mores of American workers. 
Id. 
 49. Id. at 433.  The court noted: 
While the vulgarity [of the co-worker] certainly was not commendable, it remains that the 
evidence did not go beyond showing that this one employee was vulgar.  Furthermore 
after reviewing the evidence, plaintiff’s overall work experience was not substantially 
affected by Mr. Henry’s vulgarity.  Instead, the vulgarity merely constituted an annoying 
– but fairly insignificant – part of the total job environment . . . .  Living in this milieu, the 
average American should not be legally offended by sexually explicit posters. 
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ii. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
The Supreme Court faced an opportunity to address sexual harassment 
standards in 1986.50  In Meritor, the plaintiff, Vinson, worked in a white-collar 
bank,51 and she testified that her supervisor invited her out to dinner and 
suggested that they have sex.52  Vinson testified that she initially refused, but 
then agreed out of fear of losing her job.53  Vinson further testified that her 
supervisor continued to make sexual advances, in addition to fondling her, 
exposing himself and forcibly raping her.54  This case is significant because it 
occurred in the white collar industry of banking, indicating that sexual 
harassment is not just a blue collar problem; instead it is a systemic one that 
can occur anywhere.  Even though the Supreme Court was given an early 
opportunity to set forth its sentiments relating to sexual harassment standards, 
it did not address the issue of whether the work environment should vary the 
standard.55  Rather, the Court only held that “[f]or sexual harassment to be 
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to ‘alter the conditions of 
[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”56 
iii. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 
The Supreme Court had another opportunity in 1993 to set forth a standard 
for analyzing sexual harassment claims.57  In Harris, the Court established a 
more uniform standard, but it failed to address whether certain workplace 
environments should dictate a stricter standard.58  In Harris, the female 
employee worked as a manager at an equipment rental company and was 
subjected to insults and sexual innuendoes by the company’s president.59  
Harris was insulted because of her gender and was degraded in front of other 
employees.60  On several different occasions, the president of the company 
said, “[Y]ou’re a women, what do you know,” and “[W]e need a man as the 
 
Id. 
 50. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 51. Id. at 59-60. 
 52. Id. at 60. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Most notably, the Supreme Court did not seem to indicate that it mattered where the 
plaintiff worked, only that he or she was exposed to an abusive working environment. 
 56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).  
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Vinson’s hostile work environment sexual harassment 
claim was a valid claim under Title VII and was therefore an actionable claim pursuant to Title 
VII.  Id. at 73. 
 57. See Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 19. 
 60. Id. 
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rental manager.”61  He also called Harris “a dumb ass woman” and suggested, 
in front of Harris’s co-workers, that he and Harris should “go to the Holiday 
Inn to negotiate [Harris’s] raise.”62  These, among other acts by the president, 
forced Harris to quit her job.63 
The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
president’s “conduct did not create an abusive environment.”64  The district 
court believed the correct standard to be whether the plaintiff’s psychological 
well-being was seriously affected by the conduct.65  The Supreme Court 
reversed and held that “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to 
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment 
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s 
purview.”66  Consequently, the Court held that not only does the work 
environment have to be objectively hostile, the victim must reasonably believe 
it to be hostile too.67  Accordingly, the Court stated “if the victim does not 
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not 
actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no 
Title VII violation.”68 
While the Court did not expressly speak to the work environment issue, it 
did set forth a “totality of circumstances” analysis.69  The Court said in dictum, 
“whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by 
looking at all the circumstances.  They may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”70  The Court also said the 
“effect on the employee’s psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to 
determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.  But 
while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into 
account, no single factor is required.”71  This totality test, while not necessarily 
speaking to the work environment issue, signaled a precursor for the circuit 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. 
 63. Id.  A few of these other acts included the company president asking Harris and other 
female co-workers to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket, he threw objects on the ground in 
front of Harris and asked her and other women to pick up the objects, and he made sexual 
innuendoes about Harris’ clothing.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 19-20. 
 65. Id. at 20. 
 66. Id. at 21-22. 
 67. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 23. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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courts in analyzing sexual harassment claims in light of the varying work 
environments.72 
iv. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 
In 1998, the Court faced a groundbreaking case—whether same sex 
harassment falls under Title VII.73  The Court held, in fact, that same sex 
harassment does fall within the protection of Title VII.74  Interestingly enough, 
even though the Court had ample opportunity in the past to discuss it, the Court 
finally decided this was an appropriate case to discuss the social context of 
sexual harassment: 
In [all] harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the 
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its 
target.  A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or 
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as 
he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be 
experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the 
office.  The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a 
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships 
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the 
physical acts performed.  Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to 
social context will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple 
teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or 
abusive.75 
While this does not truly speak to the work environment issue, it does confuse 
matters for lower courts looking for some guidance.  After this case, it is not 
altogether clear whether courts in looking at the work environment should be 
sensitive to the “social context”76 of the work environment or whether other 
factors should be the prevailing guidelines. 
When the Supreme Court states that courts should be sensitive to “social 
context,” it is unclear whether the Court is referring merely to the “social 
 
 72. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims depends upon the context of the work 
environment), with Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (expressly 
rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending upon 
the work environment).  In Harris, the Court indicated that whether an environment can be 
hostile is determined “by looking at all the circumstances.”  510 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).  
The Court’s use of the word “circumstances” foreshadows the Tenth Circuit’s later reliance on 
this totality of circumstances test to sanction a sliding scale standard for evaluating sexual 
harassment claims depending on the work environment. 
 73. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 74. Id. at 79-80. 
 75. Id. at 81-82. 
 76. Id. 
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context” of actions in the workplace, or to the “social context” of the actual 
workplace.77  There is a distinction between these two statements.  Under the 
first, the social context of actions taken in the workplace means that one action 
taken in a certain environment would have a different meaning than it would in 
another environment.  However, calling a woman a “slut” in the factory really 
is not any different than calling a woman a “slut” in the office.  Or slapping a 
woman on the backside in the factory really is not any different than slapping a 
woman on the backside in the office.  However, the social context of the actual 
workplace is different from the social context of the action taken.  By being 
sensitive to the social context of the work environment, courts are essentially 
allowing employers to excuse both their own and their employee’s behavior 
based upon things such as a lack of education or a sense of tradition.  It is not 
surprising that lower courts may tend to be confused by the language in Oncale 
and have, in fact, misconstrued the meaning and intention behind this dictum.78 
v. Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 
In 1998, the Supreme Court was confronted with two more sexual 
harassment cases.79  In Faragher, the plaintiff worked as a lifeguard under the 
supervision of three men.80  Faragher asserted that two of the supervisors on 
multiple occasions committed offensive touching, made lewd remarks and 
spoke of women in offensive terms.81  More specifically, Faragher claimed that 
one supervisor claimed he would never promote a woman and that another 
supervisor told Faragher, “Date me or clean the toilets for a year.”82 
In Burlington Industries, the plaintiff, Ellerth, worked as a salesperson for 
a large corporation.83  Ellerth claimed that a company manager made remarks 
about her breasts, told her to “loosen up” and then warned that he “could make 
[Ellerth’s] life very hard or very easy at Burlington.”84  When being considered 
for a promotion, the manager said Ellerth was not “loose enough” and the 
manager proceeded to rub Ellerth’s knee.85  The manager then told Ellerth that 
she would be working “with men who work in factories, and they certainly like 
women with pretty butts/legs.”86  On a later date, the manager told Ellerth, “I 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
 79. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) 
 80. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 747. 
 84. Id. at 748. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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don’t have time for you . . . unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing.”87  
The manager then told Ellerth that if she wore shorter skirts, “it would make 
[her] job a whole heck of a lot easier.”88 
Even though the Court was faced with two more important sexual 
harassment cases, the Court once again did not address the issue of work 
environment and simply reaffirmed its generic stance set forth in Oncale.89  
The Court indicated its faith in the fact that serious sexual harassment claims 
would be weeded out from those less serious offenses.90  In these two cases, 
the Court was faced with the issue of the employer being held vicariously 
liable for discrimination or harassment caused by a supervisor.91  In both cases 
the Court held that the employer is subject to vicarious liability for a hostile 
work environment created by a supervisor.92  Separate from its holding of 
vicarious liability, the Court did not address whether the context of the work 
environment should matter in evaluating sexual harassment claims.  As a 
result, lower federal courts are left with the confusing work context dictum set 
forth in Oncale—not sure how it applies to them or how it affects their 
decisions in sexual harassment claims. 
This is where the Supreme Court has left matters for the time being.  It is 
not clear whether the work environment should be taken into account after 
Oncale.  But there is clearly confusion on the matter in the lower courts, as 
noted below. 
III.  CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While the Supreme Court has decided multiple sexual harassment cases 
since the advent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there still remain some cloudy 
issues, including whether certain work environments should dictate stricter 
standards in evaluating sexual harassment claims.  Most notably, there is a 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 748. 
 89. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (noting that “the standards for judging hostility are 
sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code’”) (citing 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). 
 90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citing B. LINDEMANN & D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992) (finding that the standards for judging hostility “will filter out 
complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of 
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’”)). 
 91. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus. 524 U.S. 742. 
 92. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742.  This same 
vicarious liability standard was codified in the Code of Federal Regulations: “With respect to 
conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in 
the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have 
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective 
action.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1998). 
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circuit split between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits regarding this matter.93  What 
follows sets forth the circuit split regarding whether the work environment 
should dictate a stricter standard in evaluating sexual harassment claims 
brought pursuant to Title VII. 
A. Gross v. Burggraf Construction Company – The Tenth Circuit’s Approach 
While Gross originated before the confusion set forth in Oncale, it still 
remains an important case in the development of whether the work 
environment should matter in evaluating sexual harassment claims.94  Gross, 
the plaintiff, was employed as a truck driver for the defendant construction 
company, and was supervised by one George Anderson.95  Gross was a 
seasonal worker and an hourly employee.96  After Gross was laid off, she filed 
suit against the defendant construction company and Anderson for gender 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.97  Gross alleged that Anderson called 
her a “cunt”; he said over the radio to another employee, “Mark, sometimes, 
don’t you just want to smash a woman in the face?”; Anderson referred to 
Gross as “dumb” and used profanity in reference to her.98  Both defendants 
moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming and the district court granted the motion.99 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined it would follow the “totality of 
circumstances” test set forth by the Supreme Court in Meritor.100  In doing so, 
the Tenth Circuit determined it must look at the work environment to 
determine if the plaintiff established a legitimate Title VII claim.101  The court 
said: “In the real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not 
perceived as hostile or abusive.  Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or 
endured as normal human behavior.”102  The court went on to hold that it 
“must evaluate [plaintiff’s] claim of gender discrimination in the context of a 
blue collar environment where crude language is commonly used by male and 
 
 93. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims depends upon the context of the work 
environment), with Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (expressly 
rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending upon 
the work environment). This Comment only addresses the reasoning used by the Sixth Circuit and 
the Tenth Circuit to reach their respective decisions in these two cases.  Accordingly, the author 
does not attempt to evaluate the merits of either of the plaintiffs’ claims. 
 94. See Gross, 53 F.3d 1531. 
 95. Id. at 1534. 
 96. Id. at 1535. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1536. 
 99. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1536. 
 100. Id. at 1537 (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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female employees.”103  The court also stated that “[s]peech that might be 
offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of 
Congress, is tolerated in other work environments.”104  The Tenth Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s reasoning in Rabidue, which held that “the 
standard for determining sex[ual] harassment would be different depending 
upon the work environment.  Indeed, it cannot be seriously disputed that in 
some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.  
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound.”105  The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiff failed to 
establish that the sexual harassment was pervasive or severe enough to alter the 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.106 
B. Williams v. General Motors Corporation – The Sixth Circuit’s Approach 
Marilyn Williams sued General Motors, her employer of thirty years, for 
sexual harassment.107  Williams worked in the tool crib on the midnight shift in 
a General Motors plant in Ohio.108  Williams alleged in her complaint that 
another employee continuously used the “F-word” in his vocabulary; the same 
employee called Williams a “slut.”  William’s general supervisor looked at 
William’s breasts and said “You can rub up against me anytime;” he also told 
Williams to “back up” and, “You can just back right up to me” when Williams 
was bending over; and that the co-worker also said, “I’m sick and tired of these 
fucking women.”109 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted 
summary judgment for General Motors, holding that the alleged sexual 
harassment was not so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work 
environment.110  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, felt that there 
was still a genuine issue of material fact and reversed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment as to William’s sexual harassment claim.111 
The Sixth Circuit took issue with the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Gross 
and expressly rejected “the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies 
depending on the work environment.”112  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit 
disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Gross113 stating: 
 
 103. Id. at 1538 (emphasis added). 
 104. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538. 
 105. Id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). 
 106. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1547. 
 107. See Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 108. Id. at 559. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 560 (citing Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). 
 111. Id. at 568. 
 112. Williams, 187 F.3d at 564. 
 113. Id. 
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We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated 
trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual harassment; indeed, we find 
this reasoning to be illogical, because it means that the more hostile the 
environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a 
Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.114 
The Sixth Circuit noted that district courts were supposed to “look at the 
totality of circumstances and the context of the alleged harassment,” but that 
“does not mean that courts can point to long-standing or traditional hostility 
toward women to excuse hostile-work-environment harassment.”115 
The court pointed out that Williams was still required to establish that her 
work environment was objectively hostile and that she subjectively perceived 
the work environment to be hostile.116  The court appeared to agree with the 
Supreme Court’s logic in Oncale that sensitivity to social context is 
appropriate, but disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s logic that courts can make 
judgments as to the woman’s assumption of risk upon entering a hostile work 
environment.117 
C. Williams v. General Motors Corporation – The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Ryan of the Sixth Circuit dissented from the majority opinion.118  
The dissent believed the majority opinion was flawed because it asserted that 
the totality of circumstances test does not include the context of the workplace 
environment.119  Accordingly, the dissent contended that the majority opinion 
was “dead wrong” because the Supreme Court had made it “very clear that the 
workplace environment indeed is a component of the totality of circumstances 
to be taken into account in assessing a claim of sexual harassment under Title 
VII.”120  Additionally, the dissent noted the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Gross 
and cited the case favorably.121 
Furthermore, the dissent noted that in today’s civilized society, it is easy to 
make the argument that an employer should be obligated to provide a sensible 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; see also Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (setting forth the 
totality of circumstances test to be used by lower federal courts in evaluating sexual harassment 
claims); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (reaffirming Harris’ totality test). 
 117. Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 
75, 81 (1998)). 
 118. Williams, 187 F.3d at 569 (Ryan, J., dissenting.) 
 119. Id. at 570-71. 
 120. Id.  Judge Ryan was relying on the language set forth in Oncale: “In [all] harassment 
cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which the particular 
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.”  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. 
 121. Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (citing Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 
(10th Cir. 1995)). 
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working environment where sexual harassment is not tolerated, but that is not 
what Title VII was meant to do.122  Judge Ryan went on to note that the shop 
floor “is a rough and indelicate environment in which finishing school manners 
are not the behavioral norm.”123  Accordingly, when a woman decides to enter 
a traditionally male-dominated work environment “that may be tastelessly 
suffused with rudeness, personal insensitivity, crude behavior, and locker room 
language, she must do so with the understanding that Congress has not 
legislated against such behavior and such a workplace environment.”124  The 
dissent noted that just because the work place is hostile does not mean that the 
employer is free from liability.125  In fact, he argued the employer would be 
liable, but only if the hostile encounters were on a regular basis and the context 
of the work environment was taken into account.126 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT’S VARYING APPROACHES 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach in evaluating sexual harassment claims is to 
look at the context of the work environment to determine whether the 
harassment is sufficiently severe enough to constitute a valid claim.127  This 
approach, while problematic, is also understandable when viewed under the 
microscope of historical influences.128  The Tenth Circuit felt obligated to look 
at the work environment in evaluating Gross’s claims of sexual harassment.129  
In doing so, the court went so far as to say: “In the real world of construction 
work, profanity and vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive.  
Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or endured as normal human 
behavior.”130  However, concentrating on whether words are “indelicate” takes 
away from the true problem of sexual harassment claims—that is, whether the 
work environment is so objectively hostile or abusive as seen by a reasonable 
person, or, subjectively hostile or abusive, as to constitute a Title VII 
violation.131 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Williams, 187 F.3d at 571. 
 127. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 128. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1918 (2000) (“Even when we 
enact laws that recognize and seek to equalize women’s work roles, the remnants of family-wage 
ideology creep into the law and deplete much of its transformative potential.”). 
 129. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537. 
 130. Id.  (emphasis added). 
 131. Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).  There are two different forms 
of sexual harassment claims: quid pro quo and hostile work environments.  Quid pro quo is 
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Notably, the standard is an objective one—meaning that the work 
environment is hostile or abusive to a reasonable person, not a reasonable man 
or a reasonable woman.132  This type of standard indicates that in order to 
determine whether a work environment is hostile, courts need only look to a 
reasonable person standard.  However, under the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, 
courts should only look at what a reasonable man or reasonable woman 
perceives to be hostile.133 
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning seems not only to justify, but also to 
sanction “indelicate” behavior simply because work environments such as 
construction areas or factories are traditionally unpolished or categorically 
unrefined.134  Accordingly, the court takes the attitude that Title VII was not 
meant to change people’s attitudes in the work place.135  This is problematic 
thinking.  If Title VII was not meant to change people’s attitudes, what exactly 
is the purpose of it? 
While it may be conceded that some work environments are obviously less 
refined than others, this should not mean that courts can justify or excuse the 
unrefined behavior.  As stereotypical as it may seem, a blue collar job is more 
likely to be subject to an unrefined work environment.  But under the Tenth 
Circuit’s reasoning, a woman in a blue collar environment will have to prove 
more, meaning she would have to be subjected to more objectionable behavior 
than a woman working in an office or in a school.136  This is an inequitable 
 
recognized when an employer imposes a condition of job benefits only in exchange for sexual 
favors.  See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-09 (11th Cir. 1982).  Hostile work 
environments, on the other hand, are created when an employee is faced with sexual advances 
that are pervasive and severe enough to create a hostile or abusive work environment.  See 
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.  Because a hostile work environment can be created by co-workers, in this 
Comment only the hostile work environment will be analyzed as it pertains to standards for 
evaluating sexual harassment claims. 
 132. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. 
 133. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  While the court doesn’t explicitly state this presumption, it does quote the Rabidue 
court which affirmatively set forth: 
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and 
language are rough hewn and vulgar.  Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie 
magazines may abound.  Title VII was not meant to—or can—change this.  It must never 
be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal 
employment opportunity for the female workers of America.  But it is quite different to 
claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social 
mores of American workers. 
Gross, 53 F.3d at 138 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. 
Mich. 1984)). 
 136. This was the rationale of the Sixth Circuit in Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.  There the court 
noted it was illogical to assume that a woman who works in a male-dominated field relinquishes 
her right to work in harassment free environment.  The court said that if this was the standard, it 
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result—one that seems like a bitter pill to swallow, given that Title VII was 
meant to make the work place more equal and to prevent both discrimination 
and the disparate treatment of women.137  If this is the result, Title VII has 
made the work place “more” equal for women by allowing them to enter into 
male-dominated fields, but consequently, has shifted the burden of proving 
sexual harassment claims to women who choose to work in a male-dominated 
field, simply because they have exercised their rights pursuant to Title VII.138  
Ironically, the same mechanism that allows women the freedom to enter the 
work force would also be interpreted to mean that those same women may 
suffer the consequences for exercising that freedom. 
Of course, there are noticeable differences in certain fields of work.  A 
factory floor probably has a higher level of crudeness than a doctor’s office.  
But the problem is not the work environment itself; it is the actions taken in the 
work environment that matter.  Justice Scalia wrote for the Supreme Court: 
A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or 
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as 
he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be 
experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the 
office.139 
Justice Scalia’s argument shows that one action can convey different 
connotations in different work environments.140  Justice Scalia was simply 
pointing out that lower courts should be aware of this difference.  However, 
 
would be an inequitable result: “[T]he more hostile the environment, and the more prevalent the 
sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.”  Id. 
 137. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; see also supra notes 21-22. 
 138. What the term “equality” means is controversial.  For example, there are two types of 
feminism that deal with this notion of trying to make women adapt to a man’s environment—
equality feminism and difference feminism.  Equality feminism suggests that all gender-based 
classifications should be abolished, and the notion that all men are created equal should be 
reconfigured to include women.  Equality feminism urges that men should be viewed as the 
benchmark or reference point to women, and that women should be accorded the same 
opportunities as men based on this benchmark.  The other theory, difference feminism, suggests 
that because men and women are inherently different in some regards (such as reproduction 
capabilities and child-rearing), the law should recognize the ways that men and women differ and 
accordingly accommodate those differences.  See NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, 
WOMEN AND THE LAW 189-93 (1998).  See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex 
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1290-91 (1991) (“Society defines women . . . 
according to differences from men: hence the sex difference, as gender is customarily termed.  
Then equality law tells women that they are entitled to equal treatment mainly to the degree they 
are the same as men.”). 
 139. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 140. See Severity of Harassment and Economic Class, 16 No. 19 EMPLOYMENT ALERT 3 
(September 16, 1999). 
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Justice Scalia’s example is confusing.141  After the Oncale opinion, it seems to 
say that lower courts should distinguish certain work environments when 
evaluating Title VII claims.142  However, this is troubling because it appears 
that is probably not what Justice Scalia intended. 
The troubling part of the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning is that it is implicitly 
suggesting that women (or men) should assume the risk when they enter a 
particular type of work environment that society presumes is traditionally 
“rough hewn and vulgar.”143  After the Gross case, all women within the 
jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit who are working in the construction industry 
(or any other traditionally male-dominated field) and who file sexual 
harassment claims may find those claims to be taken less seriously than those 
that occurred in a white collar environment, simply because in the construction 
field, “profanity and vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive.”144  The 
Tenth Circuit has left no consistent rule to apply in sexual harassment claims if 
the court relies on a sliding scale to evaluate those claims.  This is troubling for 
women in hostile work environments who are looking to file a sexual 
harassment claim.  While it is known that the courts will use a “totality of 
circumstances” test,145 and they will also look at whether the work 
environment is objectively hostile or abusive as seen by a reasonable person, 
or, subjectively hostile or abusive,146 victims looking to prove their cases are 
left with many questions. 
If a woman working in an automotive parts factory wants to file a sexual 
harassment claim, does that mean she has to be subjected to twice as much 
objectionable behavior as a woman working in an accountant’s office?  Three 
times as much?  Does she have to be harassed every day in order to establish a 
valid claim?  Every other day?  Does the harassment she is subjected to have to 
be more objectionable than the harassment a woman working in the 
accountant’s office sustains?  The answers to these questions are not clear. 
The problem with implying that victims will assume the risk by entering 
certain categories of work is that it focuses on the victim’s conduct, rather than 
the defendant’s conduct, to potentially relieve the defendant from liability.  
This is analogous to focusing on the behavior of a rape victim, rather than 
focusing on the behavior of the rapist himself.  It is essentially the same as 
saying the woman asked for the harassment because she was willing to enter 
into a field that was traditionally male-dominated.  This is misplacing the 
blame.  A woman should not have to assume the risk when entering certain 
 
 141. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 570-71 (Ryan, J. dissenting).  The dissent relies on Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Oncale too broadly. 
 142. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82. 
 143. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 144. Id. at 1537. 
 145. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
 146. Id. at 21-22. 
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fields.  That is not the purpose of Title VII.  Title VII was enacted to thwart 
disparate treatment of women in the workplace and to provide equal 
employment opportunities for everyone.147 
It is illogical to assume that women can protect themselves from sexual 
harassment by not entering into certain areas of work.  If women were not 
contemplated to work in certain fields, then the purpose of Title VII is 
paralyzed.148  By holding that a woman assumes the risk, it indicates that the 
victim has consented to the conduct of the defendant and therefore the victim 
should not be allowed to complain at a later date.149  But is this the social value 
we want to keep validating?  Are these the same values that we want our sons 
to learn and our daughters to endure?  Little girls grow up believing they can 
do anything.  However, do we want to tell those same young girls that they can 
grow up to do anything they choose, yet they cannot complain about 
harassment or inequality later because they should have known what they were 
getting themselves into?  Not only is Title VII paralyzed by this attitude, but 
there is also a social policy justification for not validating it. 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Majority Approach 
The Sixth Circuit took a different rationale; it expressly rejected the line of 
reasoning used in Gross.150  The Sixth Circuit abandoned the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis after the plaintiff’s attorney “asked the court whether the conduct 
alleged in this case would be tolerated in our courthouses.”151  The Sixth 
Circuit agreed that the conduct Williams was subjected to would not be 
tolerated in the courtroom, and, consequently, it rejected “the view that the 
standard for sexual harassment varies depending on the work environment.”152 
The Sixth Circuit majority believed that it was illogical for a woman to 
have to prove “more” in her sexual harassment claims even though the only 
difference between her and another is that she works in a blue collar 
environment: 
We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated 
trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual harassment; indeed, we find 
this reasoning to be illogical, because it means that the more hostile the 
environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a 
 
 147. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 
 148. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some 
Hostile Work Environment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1135 (1995). 
 150. Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.153 
The court’s reasoning, while possibly problematic for employers, is a 
refreshing new look at Title VII’s intent.154 
This decision can be problematic for employers because under Faragher 
and Burlington Industries, an employer can be held vicariously liable for 
discrimination and harassment caused by supervisors.155  If the supervisor is 
the employee causing the hostile work environment, then the employer will be 
subject to vicarious liability.156  This means that employers are forced to 
educate their employees regarding Title VII and the possible repercussions of 
their improper actions.  But, unless the employer is resisting Title VII, this is 
not a bad thing.  In fact, this is exactly what Title VII was meant to do.157 
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An 
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from 
occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong 
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their 
right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and 
developing methods to sensitize all concerned.158 
When reading this section, particular emphasis should be placed on “all steps 
necessary.”  These three words indicate that employers have an affirmative 
duty to raise the bar in their work environments and to make sure that their 
employees are willing to keep that bar raised.  If they are not, then the 
employer should be subject to liability.159 
The Sixth Circuit recognized that it must look at the totality of 
circumstances160 and the context of the harassment.161  But it was also aware 
that those two requirements did not “mean that courts can point to long-
standing or traditional hostility toward women to excuse hostile-work 
environment harassment.”162  The Sixth Circuit held that by 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994). 
 155. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  This same vicarious liability standard was codified in the Code of 
Federal Regulations: “With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is 
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or 
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it 
took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). 
 156. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742.  See also 29 
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). 
 157. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1998). 
 158. Id. (emphasis added). 
 159. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742. 
 160. See Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
 161. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). 
 162. Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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raising the standard for women in these professions—in essence, requiring that 
they prove conduct that goes well beyond what is considered objectively 
hostile in other work environments—is unnecessary, because the objective and 
subjective tests set forth in Harris sufficiently ‘prevent Title VII from 
expanding into a general civility code.’163 
The court went on to hold that Williams must still establish objectively that the 
work environment was hostile and that subjectively she perceived it to be 
hostile.164  Furthermore, the court also said that 
[w]hile ‘[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will 
enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing . . . and conduct 
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely 
hostile or abusive,’ judgments by the court as to a woman’s assumption of risk 
upon entering a hostile work environment are improper.165 
The court recognized that it is imperative to use the totality of circumstances 
test and the objective and subjective tests regarding hostile work environments, 
but it was also cognizant that courts should not be placed in a position to judge 
a woman’s decision to work in a traditionally male-dominated field.166 
In a sense, all jobs are traditionally male-dominated, because women have 
not always had the opportunity to work outside the home.167  And if this is true, 
then all women are subjecting themselves to a potentially hostile work 
environment.  If courts follow this traditional logic underlying sexual 
harassment and a woman works in a traditionally male-dominated field, then 
either 1) that woman is assuming the risk by working in that field, and 
therefore loses her right to make a claim about it; or 2) she can still file a 
sexual harassment claim, but she must prove “more” than another woman in 
the same position who works in a white collar field.  This “traditional” logic 
would then mandate that women in virtually all fields, be it white collar or blue 
collar, would face this double-edged sword.  However, this line of reasoning 
doesn’t follow the purpose of Title VII—to eliminate the disparate treatment of 
women in the workplace.168  In fact, this type of reasoning disables the lofty 
goals of Title VII. 
If we continue to follow this logic, women will not have an honest freedom 
to choose their employment because they will be faced with the conception 
 
 163. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82) (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Schultz, supra note 128, at 1918 (“After 35 years of civil rights enforcement, many 
women are still scrambling for low-paying, often temporary or part-time, jobs that don’t come 
close to providing a living wage or decent benefits.”). 
 168. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; see also supra notes 21-22. 
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that some workplaces are traditionally “rough hewn and vulgar”169 and 
therefore they must accept that interpretation.  In today’s society, it is more 
sensible to recognize that women do not assume the risk by entering 
traditionally male-dominated fields.  It is not logical to assume that a woman 
working in a blue collar environment should have to prove more harassment 
than a woman working in the white collar environment.  It should not be the 
court’s role to judge a woman’s choice to enter into a traditionally hostile work 
environment.170  The goal of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in 
employment, not to justify it.171 
C. The Sixth Circuit’s Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion in Williams, while very similar to the Tenth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Gross, deserves its own analysis.  By quoting Justice 
Scalia’s language from Oncale, the dissent misconstrued what the Supreme 
Court intended.172  It appears that Justice Scalia was merely pointing out the 
difference between one set of behavior with two different meanings.  But the 
dissent in Williams was not urging that the statements “fucking women” and 
“slut” take on a different meaning in a factory than they would in an office.173  
In fact, those words are disturbing no matter what context they are uttered 
under.  It appears that the dissent is essentially saying that behavior in a factory 
is crude and that the people who work there are used to it, so the intensity of 
the crude behavior must meet a higher threshold in a factory than in an 
office.174  But this is not what Justice Scalia was arguing; the dissent’s reliance 
on Justice Scalia’s language is misplaced.  To equate the two arguments would 
be to say that Justice Scalia meant that the coach could express sexual desire or 
lack of respect for a player by smacking him on the bottom because that was 
just part of the game, but the same coach would be prohibited from using the 
same behavior on a secretary because it is somehow less acceptable.175  This 
interpretation is probably not what Justice Scalia intended his example to 
mean. 
Another troubling aspect of the dissent (and the Tenth Circuit’s rationale) 
is that a woman who decides to enter a traditionally male-dominated 
environment will have to tolerate more harassment than she would if she had 
remained in a traditionally female-dominated field.176  The assumption is that 
 
 169. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Rabidue v. 
Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). 
 170. Williams, 187 F.3d at 564. 
 171. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 172. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Severity of Harassment and Economic Class, supra note 140. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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blue collar workers are in some way less enlightened than their white collar 
counterparts.177  Accordingly, it follows that blue collar workers should have 
“thicker skins” when it comes to insulting or harassing behavior.178  However, 
this line of reasoning seems both antiquated and highly prejudicial.  It is unfair 
to require a woman in a male-dominated field to put up with more harassment 
than other women simply because she has exercised her freedom to choose her 
work environment pursuant to Title VII.  A woman should not have to be more 
understanding or forgiving of abusive behavior in her work environment 
simply because she has made the conscious, legal choice to be there.179 
D. The Circuit Split 
It is clear why the two circuits have split on this matter.  While the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Gross was handed down in 1995, it is not so antiquated to 
be considered outdated.  In fact, it is probably the prevailing view in light of 
the Oncale decision.180  However, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is probably the 
more favored one by women because it does not punish women for working in 
a blue collar or traditionally male-dominated field. 
While the Supreme Court has hinted at its feelings on the subject matter,181 
it most certainly has not addressed them fully enough to be meaningful to 
lower courts.  At this point, there appears to be only a circuit split between two 
circuits.182  While perhaps this matter might be viewed as trivial in the grand 
scheme of sexual harassment claims, most victims of sexual harassment will 
not regard it that way.  In fact, most women who work in a blue collar or 
traditionally male-dominated environment would probably see this as a 
massive inconsistency.  It is not logical or fair to point to a long-standing 
tradition of harassment towards women to excuse, justify or sanction the 
continuation of the same thing.  If a woman wants to work in a factory, or 
construction, or the fire department or as a truck driver, she should be able to 
do so without fear of harassment.  She should not have to prove “more” 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Severity of Harassment and Economic Class, supra note 140. 
 179. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994).  This statute gives a woman the legal freedom to 
work where she chooses. 
 180. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).  Even though Gross 
was decided four years before Oncale, the cases take similar approaches to their reasoning.  The 
troubling part of the Oncale decision is that it is not clear to what “appropriate sensitivity to 
social context” is referring.  Id. at 82.  There are at least two possible interpretations of this: 1) the 
Court simply meant the social context of actions taken in the workplace, or 2) the Court meant 
the social context of the entire workplace.  Under either interpretation, it is easy to see how lower 
courts could misconstrue or overanalyze the Court’s opinion.  See also text accompanying notes 
77-78. 
 181. Id. at 81-82. 
 182. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995), with Williams v. 
Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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harassment in her sexual harassment claims than a woman who works in a 
bank, a school or Congress.  It is critical for courts to address this problem if 
Congress or the EEOC will not.  Where work environments are traditionally 
male-dominated and obscene language has always been prevalent, courts are 
effectively saying that any woman who chooses to work in that field will 
assume the risk of the harassment that may inevitably follow.183  Essentially, 
without further action, it appears that there is no incentive to change and 
workplaces that are currently “rough hewn, vulgar and crude” will continue to 
be “rough hewn, vulgar and crude.” 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
A. Proposed Solutions 
1. Reasons for not looking at the work environment in sexual harassment 
claims 
When a woman needs to file a sexual harassment claim against an 
employer and she works in blue collar field, it is unclear what she needs to 
prove.  All lower courts have consistently applied the “totality of 
circumstances” test, as well as the objective and subjective tests of hostile 
work environments.184  However, it is less than clear if the courts will look at 
the work environment to determine if the standard should vary when analyzing 
the claim.185  Because the two tests are thresholds in evaluating sexual 
harassment claims, courts should not make it their practice to look at whether a 
woman has assumed the risk by entering into a male-dominated field.  This is 
the Sixth Circuit’s approach.186 
Critics of this approach may think it subjects employers to even higher 
standards, ones that may be inherently unfair.  However, employers are already 
subject to vicarious liability when their employees commit sexual 
harassment.187  Is it not in their best interest to follow the guidelines codified 
by the EEOC in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)188 and prevent the 
harassment in the first place, regardless of the type of work environment? 
 
 183. See Cahill, supra note 149, at 1135. 
 184. See generally Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 185. Compare Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538, with Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.  There is conflict 
between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits regarding whether there should be a sliding scale in 
evaluating sexual harassment claims depending upon the work environment. 
 186. See generally Williams, 187 F.3d 553. 
 187. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 188. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1998). 
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should 
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as 
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It is not logical to make it more difficult for women who work in blue 
collar environments to prove they have been subjected to a “more” hostile 
work environment than their female counterparts who work in white collar 
environments.  They, more than most, should have it easier in proving their 
work environment was hostile for the exact reason that courts hesitate to let 
them do so.  There is something inherently prejudicial in the assumption that 
women who work in the blue collar industry are more callous than other 
women, therefore they can handle the harassment better.  It makes no sense to 
subject them to “more” harassment, simply because they may be better 
equipped to deal with it.  Obscene language in an office is still the same 
obscene language in a factory.  Simply because a woman works in a factory 
does not mean that being called a “slut” is somehow more justifiable.  Title VII 
was enacted to even the playing field.189  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims should not 
vary depending upon the work environment is in the true spirit of Title VII and 
should be the standard that all courts follow. 
2. Means of implementing the Sixth Circuit approach 
Because there is a circuit split, the Supreme Court will have to address this 
problem before any of the lower courts can apply the standard meaningfully 
and consistently.  The EEOC or Congress can also address this problem by 
codifying it.  It might be said that the EEOC has already codified its opinion in 
the C.F.R. by stating that it will look at the context in which the harassment 
occurred.190  However, the EEOC’s codification is simply a restatement of the 
totality of circumstances test and does not fully address the issue of the varying 
standards for different workplaces. 
Once the Sixth Circuit’s standard has been implemented, women in blue 
collar work environments will know whether their particular work environment 
will dictate a stricter standard, and thus they will understand what they must 
prove in order to make a successful sexual harassment claim under Title VII.  
Until that time, there will remain the question of whether a woman working 
 
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate 
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of 
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned. 
 189. Indeed, the true purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination and to promote 
equal employment opportunities for all American citizens.  See Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 
 190. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b). 
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission 
will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the 
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The 
determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case 
by case basis. 
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and living in a “man’s world” will need to prove more than a woman working 
and living among the rest of the world. 
B. Conclusion 
Courts should not make it their business to determine whether a woman 
has assumed the risk by entering into a blue collar or traditionally male-
dominated environment.191  Where a woman chooses to work should not enter 
into the equation at all.  To vary the standard for analyzing sexual harassment 
claims depending on the type of work environment is an inequitable and unjust 
result. 
One of the biggest problems with justifying a varying standard depending 
upon the context of the work environment is that most work environments 
cannot be forced into categorical assumptions of “blue collar” or “white 
collar.”  Most fields today incorporate blue collar and white collar traditions 
into one setting.  An extremely educated person may work next to an 
uneducated person.  Part of a business may be unionized while the other is not.  
It is virtually impossible in today’s diversified business environments to 
separate out the two different categories of individuals: the blue collar workers 
whose crude or vulgar behavior is somehow more justified because of their 
circumstances, and the white collar workers who are more fortunate because 
they have chosen to work in a field that does not sanction a hostile work 
environment. 
If courts follow the logic of the Tenth Circuit, then all women are 
subjecting themselves to a potentially hostile work environment because all 
jobs are traditionally male-dominated.  This then means that if a woman works 
in a traditionally male-dominated field, then either 1) that woman is assuming 
the risk by working in that field, and therefore loses her right to make a claim 
about it; or 2) she can still file a sexual harassment claim, but she must prove 
“more” than another woman in the same position who works in a white collar 
field.  Hopefully, this is not the result that Title VII was meant to achieve. 
A more just result for women who exercise their freedom to choose their 
work environment would be for courts to follow the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach.192  Courts should not sanction a hostile work environment in some 
blue collar or traditionally male-dominated fields simply because that is the 
way it has always been and that is the way it will always be.  The standard for 
evaluating sexual harassment claims should not vary depending upon the work 
environment.  Women are given the freedom to choose their work 
environments under the mandate of Congress.193  But how free are women to 
choose their work environment if they are faced with the dilemma posed by the 
 
 191. See Williams, 187 F.3d 553. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994). 
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Tenth Circuit?194  Only if courts embrace the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning can 
women really be free to decide for themselves where they want to work.195 
It should not be presumed that women who choose to work in male-
dominated or blue collar fields are more callous or better equipped to deal with 
harassment.  Being called a “bitch” or a “slut” in a factory still holds the same 
meaning to a woman who works in an office.  If those words mean the same 
thing in the two different environments, why should courts try to justify or 
make a distinction between the two situations?  There really is no difference.  
And to continue to make the distinction undermines Title VII.  Courts should 
not make it their role to determine if a woman has assumed the risk of sexual 
harassment by entering a male-dominated or blue collar field.  Discrimination 
and harassment are still discrimination and harassment, regardless of where 
they happen and the circumstances under which they happen. 
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